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In this note we compare the laissez-faire steady-state solution in the Howitt and Aghion
(1998) model to the social optimum. The analysis offers several new insights in comparison
to the welfare analysis in Aghion and Howitt (1992). We find various new distortions
between private and optimal solution. First, a monopoly distortion effect generates too little
capital accumulation in the private solution because households' gross return per unit of
capital will be lower than in the social optimum due to monopoly power. Second, a
cost-benefit gap effect leads to excessive research in the private solution because the planner
is interested in the average technology whereas the private researcher is interested in the
leading-edge technology. Third, we decompose the well-known intertemporal spillover effect
into three subeffects and clarify why the planner does not consider other factors than the
interest rate to discount gains from innovation.
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In this note, we compare the laissez-faire steady-state solution to the social optimum in Howitt
and Aghion (1998). The analysis oﬀers new insights in comparison to Aghion and Howitt (1992).
Recall the basic structure of the Howitt and Aghion (1998) model. Firms in the competitive
ﬁnal good sector produce their good using the ﬁxed labor supply L of the economy and the inter-
mediate goods xit, i[0,1] according to the production function Yt =
R 1
0 AitF(xit,L)di, where xit
is the factor input of intermediate input i and Ait is the corresponding productivity parameter
in sector i in period t. The monopolistic intermediate good sectors produce intermediate goods
using capital only: xit = Kit
Ait ∀i. There is a diﬀerent research sector for each intermediate good.
Firms in the research sector attempt to discover the next generation of the intermediate good.
If in sector i Nit is spent on research, innovation occurs with Poisson probability φit = λnit,
where nit = Nit
Amax
t ∀i, λ is the productivity of research, Amax
t ≡ max { Ait | i  [0,1] } is the
“leading-edge” productivity parameter and nit is the productivity adjusted research intensity.
Innovation has two eﬀects, one is sector speciﬁc, the other is aggregate. The sector speciﬁc
eﬀect improves the existing intermediate good i. The improved intermediate good enters the pro-
duction of the ﬁnal good with higher productivity: Ait jumps to Amax
t . The successful innovator
is granted a patent which gives him the right to produce the intermediate good until he is replaced
by a new innovator. The second, aggregate eﬀect of innovation is a technology spillover eﬀect.
Each innovator can build on the stock of technology as embodied in the leading-edge technology
Amax
t , independent of the technology in its corresponding intermediate good sector, Ait. Since
there is a continuum of intermediate goods, Amax
t will grow continuously at a rate proportional
to the aggregate rate of innovation λnt, where nt is the aggregate research input and σ is the
factor of proportionality. The growth rate of Amax





There is a representative inﬁnitely lived household that has a utility function with constant
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. He makes an intertemporal consumption-savings decision





ε , where C is consumption, ρ is the rate of time preference, ε is the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution and r is the interest rate.
2 The Decentralized Problem
The decentralized problem is to ﬁnd the market allocation of output in each period between
consumption, investment and research. A decentralized equilibrium in the model is an allocation
that is compatible with household utility maximization subject to a standard intertemporal bud-
get constraint, proﬁt maximization in all three sectors given the laws of motion for capital and
technology, as well as market clearing on the goods and factor markets.
Firms in the competitive ﬁnal good sector take intermediate goods’ prices as given and
demand quantities of the intermediate goods such that price equals marginal product: pit =
AitF1(xit,L) ∀i ∀t. In the intermediate goods sectors, goods are produced by a monopolist who
maximizes proﬁts: πit = AitF1(xit,L)xit − ζtKit, where Kit = Aitxit. He takes as given the
user costs of capital ζt = rt + δ which consist of the interest rate r and the rate of depreciation
δ. He does not take prices as given but faces the marginal price schedule from the ﬁnal good
sector. Thus, he will supply a quantity such that marginal revenue (scaled by the productivity
level) F1(xit,L) + xitF11(xit,L) equals the (scaled) marginal cost ζt. Because Kit = Aitxit, the
1productivity parameter Ait enters both revenue and costs. Hence all monopolists in the diﬀerent
sectors will produce the same quantity xit = xt. This simpliﬁes the equilibrium condition on
the capital market: xt = ktL, where kt = Kt
AtL is the capital stock per eﬀective unit of labor
and At =
R 1
0 Aitdi is the average productivity parameter. Furthermore, the aggregate production
function simpliﬁes: Yt = F(Kt,AtL), or in intensity notation yt = f(kt). The ”marginal revenue
equals marginal cost” condition for the monopolist can then be rewritten: R(kt) = rt + δ = ζt,
where R(kt) = F1(kt,1) + ktF11(kt,1) is the productivity adjusted marginal revenue of the mo-
nopolist. It is assumed that this marginal revenue decreases in the capital stock. Thus proﬁts in
the intermediate goods sector can be expressed as a function of the capital stock: πit = Aitπ(kt)L,
where π(kt) = F1(kt,1)kt − [F1(kt,1) + ktF11(kt,1)]kt = −k2
tF11(kt,1). Equilibrium proﬁts in-
crease in the equilibrium capital stock k.
In the research sectors, productivity-adjusted research input in each sector nit = Nit
Amax
t is
chosen in order to maximize expected proﬁts. Proﬁts in case of a successful innovation are
πit = πt = Amax
t π(kt)L. Thus the sectors will choose nit = nt such that marginal costs equal
expected marginal revenue, where Vt denotes the expected revenue: Amax





t π(kτ)L dτ. This condition can be simpliﬁed to yield the familiar re-
search arbitrage equation: 1 = λ
π(kt)L
rt+λnt. Using the equilibrium interest rate as a function of k,
this expression deﬁnes a monotonically increasing relationship: nt = ˆ n(kt) with ˆ n0(kt) ≥ 0.
In a steady state, the capital market equilibrium and the research arbitrage equation can be
simpliﬁed (using the household Euler equation and the equilibrium growth rate g = σλn):
R(k) = ρ + εσλn + δ, (2.1)
1 = λ
π(k)L
ρ + (εσ + 1)λn
. (2.2)
The capital market equilibrium deﬁnes a decreasing function and the research arbitrage equation
deﬁnes an increasing function in the k − n space.
3 The Social Optimum
We now derive the social optimum. A social planner chooses consumption Ct, capital investment






1−ε . The planner has to ensure ﬁnal good market clearing: Yt =
R 1
0 AitF(xit,L)di =
Ct+It+Nt as well as capital market clearing: Kt =
R 1
0 Aitxitdi and take into account the laws of
motion for capital accumulation ˙ Kt = It − δKt and technology accumulation ˙ At = λ Nt
Amax
t σ At.
The problem can be simpliﬁed by noting that - as in the private solution - all sectors produce the
same amount of the intermediate goods (which ensures an eﬃcient production at any point in
time). Thus, an equilibrium on the capital market requires xt = ktL = Kt
AtLL and the production
function simpliﬁes to Yt = F(Kt,AtL). Furthermore, as in the laissez-faire solution [see Howitt




1+σ. Therefore, the law of motion for technology accumulation can be written as ˙ At =
λNt
σ
1+σ. Inserting the condition for an equilibrium on the ﬁnal goods market into the law of
motion for capital accumulation, we face a standard two-dimensional optimal control problem












2The ﬁrst order conditions are: ∂H
∂Ct = C−ε
t −ηt = 0 which leads to ηt = C−ε
t and ˙ ηt = −ε
˙ Ct
Ctηt. This
is the familiar condition that the marginal gain of an investment in K weighted with the shadow
price ηt equals the marginal utility of consumption today. Furthermore, ∂H
∂Nt = 0−ηt+µtλ σ
1+σ = 0








. This condition says that the gains from an investment
in K equal the gains of an investment in A. Next we calculate the multipliers µt and ηt using the




F1(kt,1) − (ρ + δ)
ε
. (3.1)
The only diﬀerence to the Euler equation in the decentralized problem is that the interest rate
is replaced by the marginal product of capital. Furthermore, ˙ µ = ρµ − ηF2(Kt,AtL)L which, by








This equation diﬀers from (3.1) by replacing the (social) marginal product of capital with that
of the factor technology. The system of equations (3.1, 3.2) describes the social optimum.
4 Welfare Properties of the Steady State
We now compare the laissez-faire steady-state and social planner solution. In the planner’s prob-
lem, as in the private steady state, the growth rate of consumption will be g = λnσ. Furthermore,
we denote π∗(kt) = F2(kt,1). Dropping time indices, the system of equations (3.1, 3.2) then
simpliﬁes. Table 1 summarizes the two solutions (equations ( ˆ K, ˆ N versus equations (K∗,N∗))
that diﬀer due to three classes of eﬀects.
laissez faire solution social optimum
ˆ K F1(k,1) + kF11(k,1) = ρ + εσλn + δ F1(k,1) = ρ + εσλn + δ K∗
ˆ N 1 = λ
π(k)L




Table 1: Laissez-faire steady state solution and social optimum
The ﬁrst class of eﬀects is related to the distribution of the period ﬂow of social surplus to the
production factors. Recall that the decentralized economy faces the problem (due to increasing
returns to scale) that total production F(K,AL) is insuﬃcient to remunerate all three factors
K,A, L by their marginal product.
Consider the following decomposition of the productivity adjusted output F(K,AL)/A =
F(k,1)L = F1(k,1)kL + F2(k,1)L into the factor incomes in the laissez-faire solution:
















Proﬁt income π(kt)L serves for the remuneration of research in the laissez-faire solution. It shows
up in the numerator of the N-equations in table 1. The social gains π(kt)∗L in table 1 correspond
to the marginal productivity of technology
∂F(K,AL)
∂A = F2(kt,1)L. This establishes the principal
3dilemma: Whereas the quantity of R&D should be determined by the marginal productivity of
innovation it is actually determined by the part of the marginal productivity of capital that ac-
crues as proﬁts. Thereby, the degree of monopoly power determines the partition of the marginal
product of capital into capital income and proﬁts.
Some intuition whether this distortion induces too much or too little R&D can be obtained
by highlighting two distinct eﬀects. We can represent them by describing the marginal pro-
ductivity of technology in terms of output and the marginal productivity of capital: F2(k,1) =
F(k,1)−kF1(k,1). Then private and social gains of innovation appear in the form ”revenue minus
costs”: π(k)L = [F1(k,1)k − (F1(k,1) + kF11(k,1))k]L and π∗(k)L = [F(k,1) − F1(k,1)k]L.
First, private and social revenue diﬀer. The planner takes into account total output F(k)L,
whereas the monopolist can only appropriate total output minus consumer surplus F1(k)kL. This
appropriability eﬀect tends to generate too little research under laissez-faire. Second, private
and social costs diﬀer, since the monopolist’s marginal revenues are lower than the marginal
revenue in the planner’s solution. In equilibrium, marginal revenue equals marginal cost. For
any given capital input, the monopolist is ready to pay only (F1(k,1) + kF11(k,1))kL to capital
owners. However, it would be socially optimal to pay the marginal product F1(k,1)kL (=capital
income plus proﬁts). This monopoly distortion eﬀect generates too much private research.
The monopoly distortion eﬀect can also be found in the K-equations: consider the remu-
neration to capital r(k)kL. The monopolist’s gain from the lower capital cost is borne by the
household supplying capital whose gross return will be lower than in the optimal solution. The
eﬀect will induce too little capital accumulation and increases with monopoly power. This eﬀect
is absent in Aghion and Howitt (1992) - simply because of the absence of capital.
The second class of eﬀects describes spillovers across sectors. It reﬂects the fact that a suc-
cessful researcher in any given sector i invents a technology Amax independently of his own current
technology Ai. The technology Amax of course enters a researcher’s cost-beneﬁt calculation when
calculating his optimal research spending N or research intensity n = N/Amax. The research
costs incurred by a social planner are also N. However, the planner is not interested in the
eﬀects of an additional investment in research on proﬁts. Recall that proﬁts are proportional to
the leading edge technology Amax. The planner cares about the eﬀects of additional research
on the average technology level A. In a steady state, the gap between average and leading edge
technology are reﬂected by the term 1
1+σ in the numerator of the N∗-equation. In a steady state,
this term equals A
Amax. We call this eﬀect a cost-beneﬁt gap eﬀect because the cost-beneﬁt
calculation of the planner and a private researcher diﬀer due to the gap between leading edge and
average technology. The magnitude of this eﬀect is small if the average technology does not diﬀer
much from the leading-edge technology, i.e if σ is small. The cost-beneﬁt gap leads to excessive
private research. This eﬀect is absent in Aghion and Howitt (1992) because the research intensity
does not depend on the leading edge technology.
The third and last class of eﬀects describes intertemporal eﬀects. First, the σ in the numerator
of equation N∗ describes the well known business stealing eﬀect from Aghion and Howitt (1992)
that we refer to as active business stealing eﬀect, as we explain now. The social planner con-
siders the incremental surplus of an innovation relative to the old technology (and not the size of
the innovation per se). This is reﬂected by the factor σ, which can be interpreted as a measure of
the impact of each innovation on the stock of public knowledge. A successful researcher becomes
monopolist, on the other hand, and gains at the cost of his predecessor without compensating
him for the basis of knowledge on which the new monopolist builds. By innovating he actively
steals the previous monopolist’s proﬁts (business). This is most obvious in the extreme case of
4σ = 0 where an innovator drives out his predecessor without generating progress. Active business
stealing is a “carrot” [Jones and Williams (2000)] for innovators and thus the creative part of
creative destruction. Note that there is a diﬀerence between this model and Aghion and Howitt
(1992) concerning the active business stealing eﬀect. In Aghion and Howitt (1992) σ could be
interpreted as the size of an innovation. The size matters for the private monopolist because
he appropriates not only the old monopolist’s proﬁts but also the gains from a discontinuous
jump (from At to At+1) in the stock of knowledge due to an innovation. The reason for this
is that he incurs research costs based on the old technology (which is the stock of knowledge
at the time he carries out research) but earns beneﬁts (conditional on innovating) based on the
new technology (invented by himself). In Howitt and Aghion (1998) no such discontinuous jump
occurs. A researcher calculates with the same Amax
t both on the cost and beneﬁt side. The
reason for this is the assumption of a continuously growing leading-edge technology which is used
as research input: recall that the research intensity is n = N/Amax. This diﬀerence to Aghion
and Howitt (1992) implies that the active business stealing eﬀect is ambiguous in this model
(whereas it generates too much research in Aghion and Howitt (1992)): for σ < 1 there is too
much research under laissez-faire, for σ > 1 the opposite is true, and for σ = 1 the laissez-faire
solution is socially optimal (as far as this eﬀect is concerned). From a social point of view, a high
research productivity σ makes a high research intensity desirable. But the monopolist ignores
technological progress σ. For σ < 1 the eﬀect induces too much private research.
Another intertemporal eﬀect arises because the social and private discount rates diﬀer. In
Aghion and Howitt (1992), this eﬀect was called intertemporal spillover eﬀect. We will de-
compose the eﬀect into 3 subeﬀects, two of which are present in both Aghion and Howitt (1992)
and Howitt and Aghion (1998), and one is new in Howitt and Aghion (1998).
First, the research ﬁrm discounts proﬁts at a rate higher than the interest rate ρ+εσλn. The
reason for this is that it takes into account the Poisson probability λn of losing its monopoly. This
eﬀect is the destructive part of creative destruction. We call this passive business stealing
eﬀect because the monopolist fears that his proﬁts are stolen by a successive innovator. This
eﬀect is the backside of the active business stealing eﬀect and is already present in Aghion and
Howitt (1992). It constitutes a disincentive or “stick” [Jones and Williams (2000)] for innovators.
The planner considers this destructive eﬀect +λn, but also considers that the destroyed old
proﬁts are overcompensated by the larger proﬁts of the new innovator −(1 + σ)λn. This fact
leads to a social discount rate that is lower than the interest rate in the Aghion and Howitt
(1992) model. This eﬀect is another occurrence of the technology spillover eﬀect, because
it reﬂects the fact that an innovator builds upon and augments the stock of knowledge in the
economy generated by innovations in other sectors. In Howitt and Aghion (1998), however, the
additional proﬁt of a new innovation has to be used to enlarge the research input in order to
support the growth rate of the larger Amax. This is due to the assumption (in contrast to Aghion
and Howitt (1992)) that the growth rate g is proportional to the research intensity n = N
Amax so
that a growing Amax implies a growing N in steady state, which in turn lowers resources available
for consumption. We label this new eﬀect consumption dilution eﬀect.
It turns out that in the planner solution the consumption dilution eﬀect exactly oﬀsets the net
eﬀect σλn of the technology spillover eﬀect and the passive business stealing eﬀect so that all
three cancel out. Concerning the discount rate, the planner thus uses the interest rate and is
consequently indiﬀerent towards growth when discounting gains from innovation. Recall that the
monopolist considers only the passive business stealing eﬀect. Therefore, the discount rate in the
private solution diﬀers from the interest rate by λn.
55 Discussion and concluding remarks
We now discuss how the distortions in the private solution relative to the social optimum aﬀect
the graphs of the research arbitrage equation and the capital market equilibrium. The monopoly
distortion eﬀect tends to generate too little capital accumulation and thus implies that the K∗
graph is always above the ˆ K graph. The shift of the N∗ graph is not uniquely determined. The
appropriability and passive business stealing eﬀect generate too little research ( ˆ N curve below N∗
curve), whereas the monopoly distortion eﬀect and the cost-beneﬁt gap eﬀect lead to excessive
research under laissez-faire ( ˆ N curve above N∗ curve). Finally, the active business stealing eﬀect
is a priori ambiguous, depending on the parameter σ. For the realistic case of a small growth



























Figure 2: Possible cases for social
optimum
distortions of the N∗ curve relative to the ˆ N curve, the private solution will have too little capital
intensity (ˆ k ≤ k∗) and too little research intensity (ˆ n ≤ n∗). This case is depicted in ﬁgure 1.
But for larger distortions, other cases are also possible. Figure 2 characterizes the four possible
combinations of too much (too little) capital (research). Sectors 1 to 4 in the ﬁgure indicate
where the social optimum can lie.
Policy measures which lower capital cost like a capital subsidy accelerate technological
progress, because a lower interest rate increases the value of an innovation via higher proﬁts
and a lower discount rate. Technically, such policy measures shift the ˆ K curve to the right.
This is an indirect way of subsidizing research and avoids agency problems of a direct research
subsidy [see Howitt and Aghion (1998) for a discussion]. The welfare eﬀects of such a subsidy
are unambiguously positive if the optimum is in sectors 2 or 3 in ﬁgure 2. Then private capital
and research intensity are moved towards the social optimum. However, if the economy is in
sector 1 where the economy overaccumulates physical capital (dynamic ineﬃciency), the welfare
eﬀects of a subsidy are not clear a priori because the capital stock is further enlarged (which is
undesirable) but the research intensity increases (which is desirable). An analogous argument
holds for an optimum in sector 4. There, a capital subsidy leads to a larger capital stock (which
is positive in that case). On the other hand, the research intensity increases although in this
sector research is already excessive. Neither case can be ruled out on theoretical grounds.
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